In brief, this critique argues that the concept of tacit knowledge is merely a term given to a phenomenon the observer does not understand as such, it has no explanatory content. Here we draw upon a critique of tacit knowledge and tacit rule following from the social philosophy literature that has not been considered in the economics literature hitherto. Conceptual disputes over tacit knowledge have instead focused on the boundaries between codifiable and tacit knowledge. Further, rather than being viewed as a hypothesis requiring conceptual clarification and empirical testing, the concept of tacit knowledge is almost invariably treated as established, even incontrovertible, virtually as a fact. It is now widely, even routinely, cited not only in Austrian economics, but also in institutional economics work, industrial economics and economic geography. The concept of tacit knowledge has come a long way from its origins in Michael Polanyi's work and its championing by Hayek and other Austrian economists.
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